Thursday, August 10, 2006

The Variable Length Bound

The variable length bound (VLB) was originated by George Jeffries. The general lays a plan. The officers follow it until the situation changes, at which time they react. As Jeffries first put it, the general had to perceive the situation change. After some gaming, it was anyone in the chain of command perceived a local threat and reacted. The game was in 10 minute bounds (or turns).

This concept originated in a study of how command works. It was supposed to put a crimp in the 200' tall general so common on the wargames table. And it gave a premium on keeping reserves (though Jeffries never said such) so you would have troops who could react. It was also supposed to give some irregularity on how the game would flow.

The game needed a local "clock" to show "what time" it was. Players would issue orders, and troops would march at pre-determined rates until the situation changed. Players would determine how much "time" had passed, update the clock, resolve the change, and then let things go again until there was another "situation change". Combat was deterministic (i.e. no dice); troops in small arms range did damage at a fixed rate, as did artillery.

We had a few questions.
  1. What triggered a change in situation?
  2. How much initiative did you want non-player subordinates to have?
  3. What were the reactions allowed to a unit?
Under Jeffries definition, any change in a situation was enough to make bring things to a halt. Turns/bounds were 10 minutes each, and as the battle progressed you stopped every 10 minutes to check on things. This slowed things down considerably.

As written subordinates were dependent upon their orders and what they could react to. They did no thinking for themselves. In one playtest troops were not allowed to stop because they didn't have orders to do so. We substituted a reaction table that showed what a subordinate could do; as we added situations, we added to the table until it became too bulky.

The only things we could find that we all agreed on was that a unit could stop and "put itself in a defensive posture". Everything else was subject to endless argument.

We scrapped it. Nice idea. The execution lacked.

I got to thinking about this. I liked the idea, and I didn't want things to be so deterministic. My view of a battlefield was one of chaos. Generals existed to bring order out of the mess. Then I read about Wally Simon's 'Whoopy Chart'. This was nothing more than a reaction table, but it was triggered by casualties.

I wrote Wars of the Sun King, and used a form of this. Players put chits with orders out next to units. They rolled dice and activated units, who then had to follow their orders. Generals ran around trying to change old orders and rally troops. The longer the turn went on, the more out-of-date the orders issued at the beginning were. And the turn could end unexpectedly, and the only orders you could change were the chits that had been "used". This focused your attention on the combat area, but left the reserve troops, and those not in the immediate danger area, with out of date orders.

This worked better than I thought. You ended up with a lot of leadership near the point of contact, and losing a general could throw the whole attack into chaos.

I ended up putting them out on the Web for anyone to use. Then one night I got a phone call from Italy. There were some gamers who had found the rules at a wargaming con in England and were using them (they'd been using them for more than a year). They had a question or two, found me on the web, and phoned me. I e-mailed them the answers (they were in the middle of a game) that night.

I began to think I could do better. I liked the chits, but I like a cleaner tabletop without a lot of markers. It detracts from the spectacle.

Now I've long been a huge fan of Tod Kershner and Dale Woods' Warfare in the Age of Reason, It's a great set of rules, simple and yet gives results that seem compatible with what we read in history. It uses a card activation system. Each brigade has a card, and when the card comes up the unit moves. When all the cards have been played, you have combat (artillery, then small arms), with morale checks as necessary. Then you do melee. There are a maximum of 12 turns in a game, though most don't get past 9 (I had one go 12 turns, and it still wasn't decided).

A card system is basically chaotic. You don't know who is going to move next. This makes a great convention game as everyone has to pay attention, you don't know who is going to be moving next. This is best done with 3 players a side, each with multiple commands.

After one game I got to thinking. I had run into a situation where a player committed to an attack because he knew it was the last turn and nothing bad would happen if the attack was repulsed. I didn't like that. I also wanted to see players more involved (it's hard to be more involved than in an Age of Reason game, but I found a way).

One day I simply tried putting an "End of Turn" card in the deck. That slowed the game down tremendously because you didn't get a result, critical attacks didn't move forward, and combat was too sporadic. So I added a second card per brigade. Then, to give more choice, a card that didn't have to be used that said 'Move any one friendly brigade". Better. Things began to move. Then, after a late night gaming session, I let the CiC (who had his own pair of cards) activate units, whether brigades or regiments. And I kept the "End of Turn" card in there.

Nobody knew if the turn was over or not. Chaos! But after watching a playtest where the lead units were pulverized by shooting, I added one more twist: when a brigade's card came up they moved and they had combat (except melee). Suddenly there was shooting all over the table. It only needed one more twist.

A British officer in the Peninsula in 1812 said the object wasn't too kill the enemy, but to break up their formations and order. Killing was a means to an end. A different author, writing on the effects of volley fire, wrote about the severe psychological stress of volleys going out and coming in. He advocated what I called the 'shock' theory of combat. You punched the enemy with shock (volley/bullets). The result was disorder in the ranks. If it grew too severe the unit fell into disorder. Local leadership would restore it (I read of a successful British attack in Korea where the unit seized the objective, but was so disorganized they were pushed back. Later that same unit made another attack, and the battalion commander got to the objective and rallied and reorganized the men, allowing them to repulse a counterattack).

This is the basis behind King's War. These are pike & shot rules for the period 1635 to about 1695. Players don't know how long the turn will last or who will move next. There is a lot of shooting and a lot of disorder. Generals run around clearing disorder (rallying the troops) and dominating the situation. Players don't even know how long the game will last! They have a general idea, but there is no 'last turn' because that is dependent upon the number of cards played.

Now given all of the chaos built into the system, do tactics actually work? In a word, yes. Deploy the troops 2 up and 1 back. Cover your flanks with obstacles. Concentrate your effort. Maximize your advantages when you can.

The theory is that players/local commanders get caught up in the in-fighting and rely upon somebody else to look out for the whole thing. Success comes from better deployments and a reserve (something most players don't keep).

Does this give a good game? Yes, players are enthusiastic about it. Is it historical? I dunno. What is 'historical' for this period? My answer is that a battle in this period was a giant brawl spiced with gunpowder. People who think you can plan things out and have things go like clockwork only show their ignorance. It didn't happen that way. That comes out in the accounts of the period. Battle was considered too chancy. An accident, a turn of ground, a momentary inspiration on the part of an officer could change everything. Only sieges were considered predictable (being seen as an exercise in logistics and digging).

Is this system applicable to other periods? I think so, and somewhere in my gaming material are the notes to do this with the Napoleonic and ACW period. Of course there were talking battles that aren't localized affairs that can be 'run' by one man. That's been the sticking point. But I think I have that figured out. Playtesting later this year. We'll see how it goes.

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